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Attacks on supermarket and blood bank refrigeration: what is happening and how to defend

Hundreds of European supermarkets and three French blood centres had their cold rooms tampered with remotely. ACN, CISA and FBI warn: the weak spot is controllers exposed to the Internet and left unpatched.

· 4 min read

A refrigerator and freezer thermometer
Photo by Tony Webster, CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

The second cybersecurity story of the week hits close to home: a campaign of attacks against the refrigeration systems of supermarkets, warehouses and healthcare facilities, which has also reached Italy. Attackers get into the controllers that run cold rooms and change temperatures remotely.

On 5 November CISA and the FBI, together with the US Departments of Health, Agriculture and Transportation, published a joint advisory. In Italy the National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN) had already asked food retailers to urgently check their remote access, and repeated the warning in early November.

What happened

Two pro-Russian groups, NoName057(16) and Z-Pentest, claimed attacks on European supermarket refrigerators, Italy included, in a video. The claim is unverified and there is no evidence linking these groups to the blood agency attack. The Kremlin rejects the accusations.

Why it works

No sophisticated vulnerability is needed. According to the CISA and FBI advisory and to ACN, attackers exploit:

The blood centres case also shows the supply chain risk: the agency itself was not attacked, the company managing its equipment remotely was.

How to defend

Diagram: on the left a controller reachable directly from the Internet with its default password; on the right the supplier connects through VPN and MFA, passes the firewall and reaches a plant network separated from the office network

These apply to refrigerators, but also to boilers, HVAC, UPS units and every "OT" device, the ones that control machines and plants:

  1. Inventory the systems. Know which controllers you have, who manages them and how they are reached. Often the maintenance company installed them and nobody in-house knows.
  2. Take them off the Internet. No management interface should be directly reachable: check with an external scan or services such as Shodan.
  3. Controlled remote access only. VPN or brokered access with multi-factor authentication, with session logs and a list of authorised suppliers.
  4. Remote access switched off when not needed. Where possible, access is opened only for the job and closed right after: the supplier asks, someone in-house enables it for the duration of the work (ideally with automatic shutoff after a few hours). Access that is switched off cannot be attacked, not even through a vulnerability nobody knows about yet. Temperature alarms only need an outbound notification, which does not require leaving inbound access open.
  5. Change default passwords and apply available updates. If the product no longer receives updates, isolate it completely or replace it.
  6. Separate the plant network from the office network, with firewall rules that only allow the traffic that is needed.
  7. Set temperature limits on the controller, so that not even a remote command can push a cold room outside safe values.
  8. Ask your suppliers how they protect their access: is it written in the maintenance contract?

Sources: BleepingComputer, the CISA and FBI advisory · TechCrunch · Cybersecurity360, the blood agency attack (Italian) · ANSA, ACN and the Italian cases (Italian)

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Written by Andrea Crippa. Corrections and feedback: [email protected]